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“A ghost is stalking the corridors of general staffs and defense

departments all over the ‘developed’ world—the fear of military impotence, even irrelevance.”
— Martin van Creveld
The Transformation of War

I

n theory, at least, the US national security decisionmaking process is rational. During this process, the decisionmaker establishes the desired goals of
policy and develops a strategy for employing often-scarce resources to achieve
these goals. This rational calculus seeks to balance both ends and means.
But this rational decisionmaking process is also vulnerable, and the
“chaos strategist” will target this vulnerability in challenging America. To plan
a strategy of direct engagement with American military forces, as Iraq learned
in Desert Storm and the Taliban did in Afghanistan, is lunacy. The chaos strategist, by contrast, must manipulate the scenario to his best advantage while
striving to prevent the introduction of American military force.
Adversaries who do not practice a similar process of decisionmaking— balancing resources and constraints, means and ends—will increasingly
look for innovative ways to “attack” without attacking directly the brick
wall of American military predominance. The chaos strategist thus targets
the American national security decisionmaking process and, potentially, the
American people, rather than American military force, in order to prevail. Such
a strategist seeks to induce decision paralysis.
In a strategy of chaos, the key objective will be to convince American
political leaders that no clear solution, end-state, or political objective (other
than the cessation of chaos) exists in the strategist’s sphere of dominance—and
that sphere of dominance may be at home or abroad. Chaos strategy, employed
by all warring parties in the former Yugoslavia and by Saddam Hussein in
Iraq, serves to initially discourage yet may ultimately provoke American
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intervention. Yet future adversaries will almost certainly use the leverage of
chaos as a strategy for gain.
In the ongoing war on terrorism, however, the practice of chaos strategy
by non-state actors, rather than by the leaders of recognized nation-states, may
only complicate the security calculus for the United States and its allies. On the
one hand, we will practice preemption against those who seek to harm our vital
interests and our way of life. Military forces will increasingly be in the business
of shooting archers, and not just catching arrows. That is to say that we cannot
just wait for chaos provocations to occur before we react.
On the other hand, non-state chaos strategists may soon recognize our
overwhelming preemption capability, and strive to shift from being “archers”
to disappear as quickly as possible. The most effective non-state adversaries
that we will face will likely display some of the following characteristics: the
facility to operate effectively as a lateral (and noncentralized) network, the
ability to learn, the capacity to anticipate, and the capability to “self-organize”
or reconstitute after they have been struck.
Non-state actors, in particular (whether or not they are sponsored by
“nation-states” or by easily targetable organizations), can accomplish vanishing
acts with far greater ease than adversarial leaders of problematic states. The
implications are important as we assess new challenges in the war on terrorism.
Moreover, we should seriously question if we are asking the right questions
about military transformation in the post-11 September security environment.
After all, we are not the only ones asking “What went wrong?”
In the case of the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington,
a feasible chaos strategy was meant to induce not only fear but also a sense of
extreme vulnerability in the American homeland. As such, the United States
entered a new security era in which attacks by non-state actors on the homeland
proved possible and US citizens, their way of life, and the specific liberties that
they had been accustomed to were now vulnerable and at risk.
Admittedly, the attacks on 11 September represented an intelligence
and interagency failure on a colossal scale; fortunately, the same intelligence
network was able to track and prove the case against Osama bin Laden and
al Qaeda with relative speed. Yet the vulnerability and transparency of the
American system led military planners and former CIA officers to proclaim
that, regarding the attacks themselves, “We couldn’t do this. . . . I have never
seen an operation go that smoothly.”1
In the future, chaos strategists may well seek gain through attacks that
cause the excessive deaths of innocents and provoke further cultural/religious/
ethnic fault lines both among contending adversaries and potential allies. Despite
all claims to the contrary, it is not yet clear that the United States is capable of
shifting from a style of warfare that might be described as the American way
of war—essentially, the annihilation of an enemy—to a style of warfare that
requires far more intense “closework.” In simple terms, are we planning for the
wars we want to fight rather than for the wars we will have to fight?
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In 1998, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in reference to the
future planning and the “transformation” of the American military, declared
on several occasions, “We’re not looking for a fair fight.” Indeed, neither is the
chaos strategist.

How Chaos Strategy Might Work
Any adversary that risks American military force engagement must
employ a method that exploits the social dimensions of strategy to offset the
disadvantages in the technical dimension.2 Such an adversary would be wisest
to target the process of decisionmaking within the policy (social dimension)
sector rather than, as a first step, planning how to engage military force (the
technical dimension) once the employment decision has been made. Seeking
to wreak havoc to his strategic advantage in his sphere of influence, the chaos
strategist must avoid treading into the arena of “vital” American interests. He
works best in the shadows, behind the curtain, off stage.
In retrospect, with regard to the September 2001 attacks in the United
States, the assailants made a crucial error. The attacks did affect vital national
interests, the resulting American will to accept military casualties in response
appeared to be high, and all roads—rightly or wrongly—almost immediately
led to Kabul.
The normal response to an enemy’s attack is to attack, of course, in
kind and with a like ferocity. In conventional war, this has always been the
symmetrical reaction. While admittedly all warfare tends toward asymmetry,
in which one seeks to exploit the weakness of the opponent and to rely on his
own strengths, the notion of rough force parity between opponents has shifted
remarkably in the post-Cold War era. An opponent who can match the capabilities of US armed forces does not exist, and will not appear for the near future.
As a result, technology and new operational concepts argue the need
for American military forces to move toward the capacity to induce response
paralysis on the part of adversaries. Indeed, concepts and beliefs embedded
in Joint Vision 2020, “Network-Centric Warfare,” “Parallel Warfare,” and the
“Global Strike Force” all rely on overwhelming technological capability to
paralyze any adversary’s response. And every adversary we have faced since
the end of the Cold War has been unable to fight back; most often they simply
have had to hunker down and take the hit.
Such force application is emblematic of two not necessarily contradictory ideas: first, the notion popular among mid- and senior-level military
officers that the military strategist can get inside the enemy’s decision cycle
(often called “the loop”), cut him off, and kill him; second, the use of technology and American reliance (some would call an obsession) on firepower allow
for high enemy damages and low friendly casualties. Edward Luttwak has partially popularized this second idea with what he terms “Post-Heroic Warfare.”3
Phillip S. Meilinger has suggested that warfare can be considered of
four types: exhaustion, attrition, annihilation, and paralysis.4 The conflict
in Southeast Asia, a protracted war from which America sought to extricate
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itself after three decades of involvement with no lasting goals achieved, is
an example of warfare of exhaustion; Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan—through coalition employment
of high-intensity strikes, high-technology weapons, precise targeting, and the
integration of special operations forces with indigenous forces to support and
help direct firepower—are examples of warfare of paralysis.
Yet the opposing chaos strategist is fully aware of America’s asymmetric, unmatched power predominance. His correct “target,” as it were, is the
“social dimension” of the national-level policy decisionmaking process as well
as perhaps the population itself. In essence, the strategist attacks what we value
most. The shift in chaos strategy is not subtle, but it is crucial that we recognize
the shift. In the future, successful chaos strategists may target us where we are
most vulnerable and will work to avoid presenting themselves as any direct
threat. Non-state actors, in particular, will find this strategy shift far easier to
accomplish than state-led chaos strategists such as Somalia’s Mohamed Farah
Aidid, Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic, or Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.
Moreover, since our military forces are not sized and structured as a
counter-value force,5 the chaos strategist will increasingly recognize that new
vulnerabilities will present themselves through targets and methods such as
these:
•• Critical infrastructure degradation or collapse, to include not only physical systems and structures, but also contamination of food supplies or resources
in ways difficult or impossible to detect.
•• The spread of infectious disease that cannot be controlled, whether or not
through the use of biological agents.
•• Intrastate as well as inter-ethnic conflict in failed or failing states.
•• Environmental stress, resource scarcity, and depletion.
•• The trafficking of drugs, small arms, and inhumane weapons, often
coupled with conflicts that are claimed as insurgencies.
•• Cyber-war.
•• Terrorism.
All these elements provide breeding grounds for future warfare. These
nightmare zones present targets of opportunity. Moreover, while none of these
aspects is necessarily new, the capacity to induce chaos is greater today than
ever before. We know, for example, that the Soviets experimented with strategic biological weapons, such as smallpox that could be delivered with ICBMs.6
Soviet weapon experts recognized, however, that smallpox could be released
far more secretively on enemy territory; thus, in an age of globalization where
disease knows no borders, chaos strategists recognize this advantage as well.
Further, the capacity and power of modern laptop computers is roughly equivalent to the entire computational power that the US Defense Department had in
the mid-1960s.7
In the past, state-led chaos strategists have at least partially achieved
their objectives even in the face of US military force. As a result, Somalia was
a failure; Iraq remains “unsolved”; Bosnia-Herzegovina is ethnically cleansed
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and, like Gaul before it, is divided in three parts; Kosovo is an international
protectorate but still part of Yugoslavia; and Afghanistan’s viability as a future
state stands in question.
But the chaos strategist wants to avoid force engagement. Even when
force is introduced and troops are stationed on the ground, as in Bosnia or in
Saudi Arabia, he wants to prolong ambiguity. Above all, the desired outcome
remains decision paralysis.
Most American defense planners naturally consider military predominance to be a major strength. But, ironically, there is an inherent weakness in
it. The immense advantages of American firepower, technology, and forces
available require clear and distinct application of means to reach ends. The
Weinberger and Powell defense doctrines, which mandate clear definitions of
political goals and American interests prior to intervention, worked in Desert
Storm because they fit Desert Storm. These same defense doctrines would have
prevented American intervention in Southeast Asia and they did prevent, up to
a point, American intervention in Bosnia.8
In American warfighter terminology, deception and surprise are
standard checklist items in thinking about war. But American intelligence
assets—in terms of technology and capabilities the most superior in history—
fall short when it comes to the unclear art of human intelligence and human
unpredictability. In truth, despite all our progress with conventional and unconventional war since the American experience in Southeast Asia, there still rings
an identifiable empathy with how the debacle of Somalia was, in some respects,
not different from the debacle of Vietnam: “If only [they] would just come out
. . . and fight like men, we’d cream them.”9 Such comments make the chaos
strategist beam with pleasure.
One Asian expert has provided a description of war in the ideal type
as having three distinct phases: engagement, chaos, and chopping of heads
( jiaofeng, luan, zhan). The master of this “intellectual” approach to warfare,
of course, is Sun Tzu, who employs jiaofeng, luan, and zhan through instantaneous, differential shock-wave application. This same authority refers to von
Clausewitz’s theory of warfare victory as an “engineering” approach, with
equally distinct phases: battle, campaign, and warfare termination—all occurring in cumulative, integral stages.10 Thus, when American warfighters speak
of “cutting off and killing” an enemy, they mean “to chop heads” in the metaphorical sense; when the chaotic warfighter speaks of zhan, or its linguistic
equivalent in a different culture, he is being literal. The chaos strategist and the
chaos warfighter prefer the removal of the enemy in the purest form. In former
Yugoslavia, this was manifested as ethnic cleansing.
Ultimately, the best guarantee of success comes when the chaos strategist has brought chaos to his enemy without battlefield engagement. As L’i
Ching, remarking on Sun Tzu’s own warfare practices, noted: “From antiquity,
the number of cases in which a chaotic army [that is, with chaos induced among
its ranks] brought victory [to the enemy] can never be fully recorded.”11 That,
of course, is precisely what new operational concepts and employment sought
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to produce in crushing the Taliban and al Qaeda forces in 2001—through
a network of unmanned aircraft that led to increased battlefield awareness,
special operations forces used as forward spotters, motivated indigenous forces,
precision major fires delivered by various means, and rapid maneuver to cause
the enemy to break. This led to battlefield success, though not necessarily to
strategic victory.
The Taliban and al Qaeda made a classic mistake in Afghanistan: they
were stupid enough to fight back. They apparently had forgotten the lessons of
chaos, or never learned them. The true chaos strategist would have looked for
ways to never engage American military force directly or would have employed
methods that our emerging style of warfare is not able to handle well.
In reality, our strategy and force planning processes are laborious,
methodical, and infinitely complex because they are planned for and fought
with extraordinary precision and detail. The strategic theory that plans for force
application as a paralysis of response does so because it wants—according to
American strategic culture—fast, precise, and overwhelming conflict resolution. Such strategy and theory seek to eliminate chaos in order not to directly
confront chaos.
Both the Weinberger and Powell doctrines reflect this American tradition. Vietnam did not fit this tradition; neither does Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq,
Afghanistan, or many other plausible future war scenarios. The paradigm for
many future battlegrounds, however, will draw on ambiguity and chaos rather
than on American battlefield predominance.
Nearly four decades ago, Roger Trinquier claimed in Modern Warfare:
A French View of Counterinsurgency that modern war is an interlocking
system of political, economic, psychological, and military actions and conflicts. Trinquier argued that armies tend to fight traditional warfare, and that
in modern war they are doomed to failure despite overwhelming firepower.12
Admittedly, with the advent of network warfare and remarkable
advances in military technology, Trinquier’s gloomy prophecy may not be as
set in stone as some once believed. At the same time, in view of the incredible
American military successes since the end of the Cold War, one might reasonably ask why we are pushing so hard and fast toward military transformation
when there are clear and present vulnerabilities that transformation does not
affect, yet which the chaos strategist will likely target.

Adapting to Chaos
In a speech at The Citadel on 11 December 2001, President Bush said:
“We have to think differently. The enemy who appeared on September 11th
seeks to evade our strength and constantly searches for our weaknesses. So
America is required once again to change the way our military thinks and
fights.” The next day, John Pike, Director of GlobalSecurity.org, was quoted in
the Los Angeles Times as observing, “Militaries change because they lose wars
or win them with difficulty. They do not change when they win wars without
hardly even trying.”13
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Yet this is not the first time in history that we have recognized our vulnerability, as well as questioned our ability to deal with that vulnerability. In the
spring of 1946, scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer, who had directed the atomic
bomb project, was asked in closed congressional testimony whether it would be
possible to smuggle elements of such a bomb into New York and then blow it
up. “Of course,” replied Oppenheimer, “and people could destroy New York.”
When allegedly a nervous Senator then asked how such a weapon smuggled in
a crate or suitcase could be detected, Oppenheimer simply answered, “With a
screwdriver.”14 The document that eventually came out of that testimony, known
as the “Screwdriver Report,” remains classified to this day. In essence, though,
there seems to have been a recognition six decades back that although there was
no direct threat at the time, we were clearly vulnerable to chaos attack.
While this article does not suggest that chaos strategists will inevitably defeat the United States, such strategists can—and often do—bedevil
the national security decisionmaking process. Used with the right measures
of surprise and undetectability, a chaos strategy could disrupt and possibly
destroy the Clausewitzian trinity. In this scenario the people’s faith in government could be erased and the third leg of the trinity, that of the commander and
the army, could do little or nothing to prevent that destruction.15
In truth, chaos strategists cannot defeat the United States or its allies in
any traditional sense. We will be targeted, however, where the symbols of our
strength reside. Although the Word Trade Center was not an irreplaceable node
in terms of economic power, and even with the astounding resiliency that the
United States displayed in recovering from the 11 September attacks, the total
cost of lost worldwide economic growth and decreased equity value as a result
of them could exceed one trillion dollars.16
Even as the United States has the capacity to bring massive firepower on
the battlefield—along with an increasingly sophisticated network of intelligence
systems, information architecture, unmanned systems, and joint and combined
force operations—we should expect to see chaos strategies come into play in
future engagements. Too exclusive an emphasis on technological solutions in
warfare—and in determining political outcomes—may well prove problematic.
Although a cliché, it remains true that we must prepare for the warfare we may
find it necessary to fight, and not plan for the wars we want to fight.
Every single military engagement since the end of the Cold War suggests that we have dispatched our adversaries with ease on battlefields and in
direct engagements. This would seem to be an argument against rapid transformation of the armed forces. Why bother, after all, to change the military
when no one else can stand up to it? Increased battlefield awareness, the likely
increased future use of special operations forces and indigenous forces, precision major fires delivered by various means, and rapid maneuver to cause the
enemy to break, as well as what one observer has called the phenomenon of
“marines turned soldiers,” has fundamentally altered how we fight.17
In truth, we have proven so successful in our post-Cold War military
improvements that the likely increased costs for transformation envisioned
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by the Bush Administration may well prove unnecessary and too expensive.
Transformation skeptics, such as the Brooking Institution’s Michael O’Hanlon,
counterargue that the US military is already innovating at an acceptable rate—
in what O’Hanlon terms a process of “ambitious incrementalism”—and simply
does not need to radically accelerate the pace of technological advance.18
But the arguments which suggest that constrained resources and the
dictates of the political economy are what most constrain transformation seem
to miss the mark completely. What may well be lacking is the need to recognize
“closework.” As Larry K. Smith phrases it:
Overwhelming force implies, almost by definition, a lack of precision.
That won’t work now. What we’re going to need is a much greater
emphasis on the concentrated application of street smarts. I call these
sorts of operations “closework.” They are extremely precise missions
that are used when the results are absolutely crucial. They demand
the very highest standards of intelligence, of training, of preparation,
of timing and execution. We haven’t been particularly good at this in
the past.19

Closework also suggests that urban warfare and often brutal forms of
engagement will be likely in the future. Rather than relying more on distance
warfare and precision engagement, we may fundamentally turn in a new direction. If it is true, for example, that one of two people on the face of the earth will
live in urban environments and one of two people will live in “water-stressed”
areas at some point within the next two decades, then the complexity of intersecting forces can bring about profound and often vicious consequences. These
consequences might include—but certainly not be limited to—critical infrastructure collapse, the outbreak of infectious disease that cannot be controlled,
and intrastate as well as inter-ethnic conflict related to resource scarcities (such
as water) and environmental stress. We may well be entering into chaos.
We can expect to enter also into some debate about how best to meet
the challenges of future chaos. Admittedly, there is a danger of overestimating one’s real or potential enemy; there is a greater danger of not recognizing
one’s enemy at all. But there is a need to consider alternative ways to deal with
future war. As General Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, admonished his
own service and those who did not want to consider alternatives, “If you dislike
change, you’re going to dislike irrelevance even more.”20
The arguments for transformation—and its relevance to protecting
the vital interests of the nation—should reasonably have only just begun. To
suggest that we actually understand the challenges of the future and can adapt
our armed forces with relative ease is a flawed assumption. To the contrary,
the science of complexity, future uncertainty, and understanding what specific
changes to make in protecting our vulnerabilities should all prove central to
what should be one of the most vigorous debates in our nation’s history.
Policymakers and decisionmakers will need to adapt to counter future
“chaos strategies,” where our adversary’s essential aim is to achieve victory
through avoiding defeat. Potential, though plausible, national security responses
include the increased use of covert actions, as well as special forces, in place of
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more traditional wartime forces and resources. In the end, it does not matter much
if future chaos attacks will be illogical or disjointed. Chaos—and its intended
effects—will prove more significant than a cohesive strategy that viably links
means to ends. As an adage in India claims, one way to kill a tiger is to distract
it from so many different sides that it tries to run in every direction at once.
Will we adapt to chaos as strategy? That remains to be answered in the
war that is still to come.
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